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This paper analyzes the evolution in bank performance following the removal of legal 
restrictions on the entry of foreign banks in three transition economies: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland. Two modes of foreign bank entry are considered: entry by Greenfield 
investments, and by foreign mergers and acquisitions of domestic banks. For this purpose, we 
construct a panel data of banks from the three countries over the period 1994-2004. We 
determine the dates on which liberalization occurred in each country. Bank performance is 
reflected by accounting measures of profitability, net interest margin, and operating costs. 
The results show a very limited effect of the entry of Greenfield banks on domestic banking 
market in the early transition period. In contrast, the foreign entry by mergers and 
acquisitions of domestic banks exerts significant impacts on bank performance. Indeed, we 
observe significant declines in banks' profits and net interest margins, and a significant 
increase in operating costs. Our results have important policy implications for those emerging 
and transition economies still hesitant to liberalize their banking markets. 
  
JEL Classification: G21, F36, C01. 
Keywords: Banking, Transition Economies, Foreign Bank Entry, Greenfield Investment, 
Mergers and Acquisitions, Bank Performance. -2- 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the world of banking has experienced an unprecedented trend 
towards internationalization. One aspect of this increasing financial integration is the 
dramatic change in foreign participation in emerging markets' banking systems, especially 
since the second half of the 1990s. Central and Eastern Europe is a region that has seen a 
particularly stunning increase in international banking presence. Indeed, foreign presence 
here rose from around 10% at the end of 1994 to around 50% of total banking system assets 
at the end of 1999 (Mathieson & Schinasi, 2000), and are now major players in these 
markets.  
There were two waves of foreign bank entry into these economies – first, by setting 
up de novo investments in the host countries, and second, by acquiring (generally sizable 
state-owned) domestic banking institutions. These entries have been made possible by 
gradual relaxation of restrictions on both modes of entry by foreign banks. Given one of the 
main objectives of these countries in liberalizing their banking systems is to promote banking 
efficiency, it is useful to assess whether this policy has been effective. 
So far, the most commonly adopted approach to assess the effect of foreign bank 
entry on bank performance is to conduct a comparative analysis of bank performance 
between foreign and domestic banks. Findings for emerging and transition economies 
generally show that foreign banks fare significantly better than their domestic counterparts 
even when different types of performance measures are taken into account. These findings 
are taken to represent positive effects of foreign bank entry on bank performance. In our 
opinion, this type of evidence is, to a certain degree, questionable, because the better 
performance of foreign banks may raise the average performance of the whole banking 
system, but this does not mean that foreign bank entry has helped improving the performance 
of domestic banks. Yet, the objectives of governments in liberalizing foreign entry are not 
only to admit good performers to their markets, but also to provide domestic banks with a 
means to improve their own performance.  
A more direct test on the effects of foreign bank entry on bank performance has been 
to investigate the relationship between the change in the degree of foreign bank presence and 
host markets’ bank performance. This relationship has been found to be positive and 
significant, which has been interpreted as another evidence on the benefits that foreign banks 
bring to host countries’ banking markets.  -3- 
 
In this paper, we propose another direct approach for testing the effects of foreign 
bank entry on bank performance by using a variance of the event study methodology. Indeed, 
we investigate whether bank performance changes following the removal of legal restrictions 
separately on each mode of entry of foreign banks, i.e. greenfield investments versus foreign 
mergers and acquisitions of domestic banks
1. To the best of our knowledge, this represents 
the first attempt to do so in the context of transition economies. Moreover and most 
importantly, we are the firsts to focus on the differential impact of the two modes of foreign 
entry on host countries in an empirical setting.  
The results show a very limited effect of the entry of Greenfield banks on domestic 
banking market in the early transition period. In contrast, the foreign entry by mergers and 
acquisitions of domestic banks exerts significant impacts on bank performance. Indeed, we 
observe significant declines in banks' profits and net interest margins, and a significant 
increase in operating costs.  
Our paper is related to two strands of literature: the theoretical literature on foreign 
bank entry, and the empirical literature on the effects of foreign ownership on bank 
performance. 
Theoretical analysis on foreign bank entry has been scarce. (Buch C. M., 2003) sets 
up a theoretical model on foreign bank entry and demonstrates empirically that large 
information barriers discourage the entry of foreign banks. (Hauswald & Marquez, 2003) 
shows that information spillovers from incumbent banks to potential entrants lead to a 
decrease in interest rates and profitability of banks. (Kaas, 2004) constructs a model of spatial 
loan competition and concludes that foreign bank entry is generally too low in comparison 
with the socially optimum level. (Sengupta, 2007) considers the consequences of asymmetric 
information on foreign bank entry, and demonstrates that both better information ex-ante and 
better creditor protection ex-post facilitates the entry of outside competitors with a cost 
advantage.  
Of particular interest to our paper are the three studies that have taken into account the 
impact of the entry modes of foreign banks on host countries’ banking markets. Indeed, 
(Claeys & Hainz, 2006) investigates the impact of entry modes on local credit markets, in 
particular on domestic banks’ interest rates. It has been shown that de novo entry intensifies 
                                                 
1 We define foreign banks as those in which foreign owners (Companies + Individuals) hold at least 50% of total 
share capital. A greenfield investment involves the establishment of an institution from scratch, whereas a 
merger and acquisition implies the purchase of a firm's (here a bank's) shares or other form of capital. In this 
paper, we are exclusively interested in a control acquisition, i.e. the purchase of equal to or more than 50% of a 
bank's capital. -4- 
 
competition, and consequently domestic banks’ interest rates decrease. (Van Tassel & 
Vishwasrao, 2007) studies entry mode choices by foreign banks, and their impact on host 
countries. The results show that foreign banks prefer de novo entry to acquisition entry in 
order to capture target banks’ informational advantages. On the other hand, it is most likely 
that credit allocations will improve when foreign banks enter by acquiring target banks with a 
relatively high proportion of good clients. With regard to de novo entry, this intensifies 
competition, and consequently leads to a decrease in market interest rates. (Lehner & 
Schnitzer, 2008) finds that de novo entry intensifies competition, and consequently leads to a 
decrease of banks’ interest rates and market shares. This lessens the incentives of banks to 
investigate in screening technology. Thus, the authors conclude that domestic banks’ 
incentives to invest in screening technology are stronger with acquisition entry than with de 
novo entry. Our paper contributes to this literature by providing empirical evidence on the 
differential impact of entry modes by foreign banks on bank performance.  
Our paper is directly related to the empirical literature addressing the effect of foreign 
ownership on bank performance. There are two main approaches to the topic. The first one is 
to directly consider the impact of a change in regulatory conditions or a change in the level of 
foreign bank participation on bank performance. General results indicate that foreign bank 
entry is associated with an increase of competition in domestic banking markets, which leads 
to an improvement in bank performance.
2 The United States, Latin America, and Asia are 
geographical areas that this line of literature has focused on
3. No study has been carried out 
on transition economies using this approach. 
The second approach is to conduct a comparative analysis of bank performance 
between foreign and domestic banks. The methodology used within this approach is on the 
whole similar. Most of them first calculate the indicators of bank performance based on data 
on financial statements of individual banks. Typically, three sets of indicators are used to 
measure bank performance. First are standard measures of financial performance, namely 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). Second are accounting measures of 
operating performance and third are efficiency and productivity measures constructed 
through frontier estimation techniques or data envelopment analysis. Then, these studies 
regress these indicators on a set of explanatory variables, especially ownership variables, in 
order to assess the importance of various determinants of bank performance. A limited 
                                                 
2 See (Barajas et al., 2000) (Claessens et al., 2001) (Denizer, 2000) (Unite & Sullivan, 2003) amongst others. 
3 See (Chong, 1991) (Schranz, 1993) (DeYoung et al., 1998) (Jayaratne & Strahan, 1998) for US, (Ghosh et al., 
2008) (Denizer, 2000) (Isik & Hassan, 2003) (Unite & Sullivan, 2003) for Asia, (Barajas et al., 2000) (Clarke et 
al., 1999) for Latin America, and (Claessens et al., 2001) (Bayraktar & Wang, 2004) for cross-country studies. -5- 
 
number of studies have taken into account the impact of the modes of entry of foreign banks 
on bank performance. 
Most geographical areas have been taken into account: United States, Western 
Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe in transition, and Asia including China. The results 
are contradictory for developed and developing economies. Indeed, in developed economies, 
foreign banks are found to be less efficient than their domestic peers. However, some banking 
organizations, particularly from the United States, are found to consistently operate at or 
above the efficiency levels of domestic banks (Berger, DeYoung, Genay, & Udell, 2000). By 
contrast, empirical evidence on developing economies points out that foreign banks are more 
efficient than domestic banks. In particular, in line with the broader case, studies focusing on 
transition economies also find a positive relationship between foreign involvement, foreign 
ownership, as denoted by different levels of participation of foreign banks in domestic banks, 
and bank performance (Bonin, Hasan, & Wachtel, 2005b). Moreover, with respect to the role 
played by the modes of entry of foreign banks, while Greenfield banks are found to 
outperform both M&As and domestic banks, the comparative performance between M&As 
and domestic banks remains unclear (Havrylchyk, 2006) (Vo Thi & Vencappa, 2008).  
Thus, we contribute to this literature by directly considering the impact of foreign 
bank entry on bank performance using an event study methodology. To the best of our 
knowledge, this represents the first attempt to do so in the context of transition economies. 
Moreover and most importantly, we are the firsts to focus on the differential impact of the 
two modes of foreign entry on host countries in an empirical setting. Indeed, theoretical 
literature on foreign direct investment is mostly concerned by the determinants of enterprises' 
choice of entry modes. Little is said on their implications for host countries. This paper 
therefore represents a step towards analyzing the welfare effects of different modes of FDI 
into banking. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief account of banking sector 
reforms and the associated entry of foreign banks into the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland. Section 3 describes the data and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 




2. Banking Sector Reforms and the Entry of Foreign 
Banks 
The aim of this section is to give the reader an account of banking sector reforms and the 
associated liberalization to foreign bank entry in the three countries that serve as field studies 
for this paper: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. We will draw on major themes and 
discuss common and divergent features for these countries.  
2.1. Banking at the beginning of the transition, and first wave of foreign 
bank entry by Greenfield investments 
 
As is the case for other former communist economies, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland, the transition towards a market-based banking system starts with the break-up of the 
mono-bank system into a two-tier banking system with the former mono-bank assuming 
central bank functions, and its separated entities assuming commercial bank functions. The 
number and types of units into which the commercial operations of the mono-banks were 
divided vary across countries.  
Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic, the break up led to the creation of one bank, Komercní Banka, which 
inherited a loan portfolio consisting of almost all of the Czech Republic’s commercial loans 
as well as the Czech component of the mono-bank’s payments system. Moreover, there are 
four specialized banks: Cˇeska´ Sporˇitelna (CS), the savings bank; Investicd nıB Banka (IB) 
specialized in development and investments involving foreign companies; Cˇeskoslovenska´ 
ObchodnıB Banka (CˇSOB), the foreign trade bank; and Zˇ ivnostenska´ Banka (Zˇ B) 
specialized in foreign currency deposits. 
Hungary 
In Hungary, three nation-wide banks were created (the Hungarian Credit Bank - MHB, the 
Commercial and Credit Bank - K&H, and Budapest Bank - BB) and specialized by sectors, 
i.e., industry, agriculture, and small business and utilities. In addition, there are four 
specialized banks: the National Savings Bank (OTP), the Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank 
(MKB), the General Banking & Trust (ÁÉB), and Postabank which was established by 
government initiative in 1988 (Majnoni, Shankar & Várhegyi, 2003). -7- 
 
Poland 
In Poland, the new nine commercial banks are specialized by region, and effectively have 
control of the region’s financial services in the short run. In addition, there are five 
specialized banks: Bank Handlowy w Warszawie S.A. (BH), the foreign trade merchant 
bank; Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. (Pekao), a savings bank specialized in collecting retail 
deposits in foreign currency and handling foreign currency transactions involving private 
persons; Powszechna Kasa Oszcze¸dnos´ci- Bank Pan´stwowy (PKO BP), another savings 
bank specialized in zloty household deposit-taking and in financing housing construction; 
Bank Gospodarki Z° ywnos´ciowej S.A. (BGZ), a national umbrella bank for local 
cooperative banks involved in the financing of agriculture and food processing; and Bank 
Rozwoju Eksportu S.A. (BRE) specialized in export financing (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997). 
 
Each of the above approaches to carving out commercial banks from the former mono-bank 
represents a trade-off between short-run franchise value derived from monopoly power and 
long-run franchise value derived from efficiency in the banks. In fact, the minimal 
restructuring in the Czech Republic and Hungary endowed the commercial banks with strong 
market positions, thus enhancing their financial stability in the early reform period. However, 
the absence of real competition does not provide these banks with the incentives to increase 
their efficiency in the longer run term. The more extensive restructuring in Poland generated 
banks with less market power and with portfolios more vulnerable to the economic conditions 
in their regions. While some of these banks became insolvent or need government 
intervention, others developed stronger portfolios, contributing to faster improvement in the 
provision of banking services (Meyendorff & Snyder, 1997). 
In parallel with the break-up of the mono-bank, banking acts were adopted allowing 
the entry of new banks. Together with private domestic banks, foreign banks have taken this 
opportunity to enter these countries. At this stage, their entries often take the form of 
Greenfield investments. 
Czech Republic 
Indeed, in the Czech Republic, the Act on Banks was passed in February 1992 which allowed 
the licensing of foreign banks. Between 1989 and 1993, several foreign-owned banks were 
set up, all specialized in investment banking and services to companies and high-revenue 




In Hungary, before the start of the transition in 1987, foreign banks were already present in 
the forms of offshore banks or joint-ventures with domestic banks. In the new era, liberal 
bank licensing policies encouraged new bank entry in the market. Most of the de novo entries 
of foreign banks are via wholly-owned subsidiaries. Moreover, foreign owners have bought 
out the Hungarian partners in the early joint ventures. The Banking Act of December 1991 
allowed foreign banks to have more than 10% of equity share in domestic banks. 
Poland 
In Poland, the Act on Banking voted in January 1989 effectively opened up the market to 
foreign investors. During the first two years of transition (1990−1991), four foreign banking 
institutions were established of which three under their brand names, namely Raiffeisen-
Centrobank (established together by Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG and Centro 
Internationale Handelsbank AG), Creditanstalt and Citibank. ING Bank N.V. and Societe 
Generale established branches in Warsaw. Seven other foreign banks were established in the 
years 1990−1993 by a number of other foreign banks, investment funds, foreign companies 
and, in some cases, with a small participation of Polish state-owned banks or enterprises and 
state agencies (Balcerowicz & Bratkowski, 2001). 
2.2. Banking crises and restructuring 
 
Like in other transition countries, most of the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland started with extensive non-performing loans. A larger 
part of these troubled loans were inherited from the past communism. The other part was 
created during the transition process due to the legacy of non-market-based allocations of 
credits. By 1992, bad loans were estimated to vary from 2.4-19% to 50-66% of total loans in 
the Czech Republic, to approximate 20.7% in Hungary, and 30% in Poland
4 (Tang, Zoli, & 
Klytchnikova, 2000), thus constituting one of the most critical obstacles to the operation of 
the banking systems in the three countries.  
In order to deal with these solvency crises, a number of actions have been taken to 
clean up banks’ balance sheets, whose nature and frequency vary.  
Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic, in 1991, a consolidation program was initiated to clean up state-
owned banks’ balance sheets and to strengthen their capital. The program included the 
                                                 
4 These numbers should be taken as indicative. -9- 
 
following operations: (i) transfer of assets to Konsolidační Banka, a state institution aimed at 
acquiring, administering, and amortizing the four state-owned banks’ communist-era bad 
loans; (ii) write-off of loss loans from the National Property Fund’s resources; (iii) increases 
in the capital of the banks split off from the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and of 
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka (CSOB); and (iv) transfer of credits and guarantees from 
ČSOB to Česká Inkasní (ČI), a state institution created in 1993 to take over debt obligations 
of foreign trade companies to facilitate privatization of CSOB. The net cost of this program 
has been estimated at about CZK 100 billion (Tuma, 2002). The results were not satisfactory 
as non-performing loans continued to be consistently high throughout the 1990s due to 
persistent unsound lending practices and because of external events such as the May 1997 
Krone crisis, the floods and investments in Russian derivatives  (Bonin & Wachtel, 1999). 
There are two more consolidation and stabilization programs in 1996-1997 to address 
liquidity crises in small private banks. Moreover, a so-called London approach to loan 
recovery was also adopted, consisting of a set of rules for reaching out-of-court settlements 
between the banks and debtor enterprises.  
Hungary 
In Hungary, in 1991, the Hungarian government formally guaranteed about half of the stock 
of recognized non-performing loans in the three major state-owned commercial banks. Then, 
in 1992, with a significant growth in new bad loans, a loan consolidation program was 
initiated, aiming at transferring substantial portions of the commercial banks’ non-performing 
loans to the Hungarian Development and Investment Company in exchange for government 
bonds. Next, in the following year, this program was expanded both to encourage enterprise 
restructuring and to promote the sale by banks of their bad debts to companies that 
specialized in collections and workouts. As part of the program, the banks received nearly Ft 
80 billion in state funds for recapitalization of the banks (Meyendorff & Snyder, 1997). 
Moreover, in the case of MHB, the “good bank/ bad bank” approach was used as its bad 
assets were transferred to a subsidiary, Risk Kft in july 1995, which was to be wounded up in 
three years while the good bank was successfully privatized. The second recapitalization 
ultimately proved to be successful because soon afterwards Hungary adopted a policy of 
privatizing state banks by selling controlling shares to strategic foreign investors. 
Nevertheless, there are two more recapitalization rounds to address solvency problems in the 
state-owned agricultural bank (Agrobank) in 1995, and in the second largest retail bank 
(Postabank) in 1997.  -10- 
 
Poland 
In Poland, from 1989 to 1992, a significant part of the original bad loans were swept by 
Poland’s hyper-inflation. After plans for restructuring enterprises and privatizing banks were 
adopted, an Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program was launched with an aim to 
recapitalize and resolve the problem of nonperforming loans prior to the privatization of 
state-owned banks. Using the Polish Bank Privatization Fund supported by the World Bank, 
the Polish government decided to proceed with a one-time recapitalization of the banks, 
based on the value of the portfolio of bad debts at the end of 1991. However, as a condition 
for participating in the program, banks were obliged to create work-out units and actively 
pursue collection through several instruments, and were required to resolve all their non-
performing loans at the end of 1994. Nine state-owned banks were affected by this reform. 
The outcome of the restructuring program is generally considered as positive: the share of 
non-performing loans in loan portfolios of the eleven major banks was reduced from 30% in 
1992 to 9 percent in 1996 (Meyendorff & Snyder, 1997) (Weill, 2003).  
Thus, the measures adopted to resolve bad loans problem in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary represent a combination of a centralized approach (i.e. transferring of bad debts to a 
“loan hospital”) and a decentralized one (i.e. non-performing loans remaining on the bank's 
books, and work-out units being created within the banks to pursue the recovery of these non-
performing loans). In contrast, Poland adopted solely a decentralized approach. Moreover, in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, banking crises resolution was characterized by repeated 
rounds of recapitalization, which calls into question the government’s commitment not to bail 
out failed banks, and setting up moral hazard problems. In contrast, Poland has pursued a 
more credible no-bailout policy with its one-time recapitalization program. The end results 
were more successful for Hungary and Poland as the shares of troubled loans declined 
subsequently to restructuring programs. By contrast, in the Czech Republic, these were 
consistently high throughout the 1990s as noted above. 
2.3. The Need for Privatization: Second Wave of Foreign Bank Entry by 
Acquiring Former State-Owned Banks 
 
However, removing troubled loans from banks and recapitalizing them were far from enough 
to improve bank efficiency and prevent recurrence of other banking crises, so far as banks 
continue to be dependent on the government and its directed lending policies, and to 
perpetuate links with poorly performing state-owned enterprises. The Czech experience has 
shown that early recapitalizations were of little benefits because soft lending practices -11- 
 
continued and future bailouts became necessary. By contrast, the repeated recapitalizations in 
Hungary were ultimately successful because privatization to an independent, usually foreign, 
owner followed rapidly. The point here is that following recapitalization and restructuring, 
the corporate governance problem in banks was to be addressed so that an independent 
banking sector was developed, freed from non market-based practices. The key to a corporate 
governance reform is to transfer bank ownership to private hands. Effectively, this was these 
privatization processes that drew a second wave of foreign bank entries through mergers and 
acquisitions of domestic banks. 
Czech Republic 
Indeed, the Czech Republic was involved in two waves of privatisation of state-owned banks. 
The large Czech banks were transformed into joint-stock companies in 1992 and three out of 
the largest four state-owned banks were partially privatized within the first wave of voucher 
privatization. CSOB was excluded because of its unique involvement in foreign financial 
markets
5. The state, nevertheless, kept controlling stakes in these banks, in line with the state 
applied principles adopted in 1991 according to which the state would retain control of at 
least 40-50% of the basic capital, foreign participation would be held to a 25% maximum, 
and no single foreign investor would be permitted more than a 10% stake (Simonson, 2001). 
The exception was Zivnostenka Banka, which was sold to foreign investors in 1992 (Weill, 
2003) (Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, & Schobert, 2008).  
Inadequate governance and lack of effective corporate restructuring led to a fragile 
banking system with relatively low foreign participation. This meant that the first wave of 
privatization proved to be a failure in resolving structural problems of banks.  By 1998, 
Czech government stakes were 65.7% in CSOB, 45% in CS, 36.3% in IPB, and 48.7% in KB 
(Simonson, 2001, p. 201). The weaknesses of the state-owned banks with large holdings of 
non-performing loans, and the goal of accession to the European Union has pushed the newly 
elected government to adopt a new privatization program in April 1997 with the aim of 
accelerating state-controlled banks’ privatization. In 1998, the government sells its stakes in 
IPB to Normura (Bekaert & Harvey, 2004). The privatization process gathered speed in the 
second half of 1999 with the sale of CSOB to Belgium’s second largest. In February 2000, 
Austria’s second-largest banks agreed to buy a 52% stake in CS, bringing foreign 
participation to about 54% (Mathieson & Schinasi, 2000). Also in 2000, Komercni Banka 
was successfully privatized to Societe Generale of France.  
                                                 
5 The government feared that voucher privatization might alter CSOB’s viability and have negative effects on 
monetary stability (Simonson, 2001, p. 201). -12- 
 
Hungary 
In Hungary, the privatization program was launched in 1994 following two recapitalization 
schemes. The first significant privatization took place with the partial sale of Hungarian 
Foreign Trade Bank (MKB) in the summer of 1994 to EBRD (financial investor with a share 
of 16, 68%) and Bayerische Landesbank (strategic investor with a 25,01% share) whose stake 
increased two years later (in January 1996) when the state sold its 25 percent share. The same 
scheme characterized the sale of Budapest Bank in 1995 to GE Capital (27.5% of shares) and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (32.5%). During 1996-97 
MHB, K&H and other commercial banks were sold to strategic foreign investors, according 
to the basic scheme of the Hungarian bank privatization that privileged the pursuance of a 
strategic foreign presence. A second scheme was followed by the Hungarian authorities with 
the partial sale in the summer of 1995 of the largest retail bank, National Savings and 
Commercial Bank (OTP). The transaction involved a private placement of Global Depositary 
Receipts representing approximately 20% ownership in OTP in international capital market 
and a domestic placement of approximately 15%. The government retained approximately 
50% ownership stake and asserts control through the Board (Kormendi & Schnatterly, 1996). 
By forbidding the presence of strategic investors and by promoting a prevalent domestic 
ownership, the Government wished to create a diversified proprietary structure, dominated by 
institutional investors. Overall, the privatization of the Hungarian banking system was 
practically completed by the end of 1997. By that time state ownership had dropped to 21 per 
cent of bank capital while the foreign stake had increased to over 60%. At the end of 2000 
state ownership had dropped to 19% while the foreign stake had increased to over 66% 
(Majnoni, Shankar, & Varhegyi, 2003). 
Poland 
In Poland, the whole privatization process can be divided into two phases.  The first phase, 
from 1993 to 1997, is the one of delayed privatization, with foreign investors being allowed 
to participate, but entitled only to minority shares. The second phase, from 1997 to 2000, can 
be characterized as fast privatization, with all state-owned banks being privatized, most of 
them to foreign strategic investors. 
On March 16, 1993, the first step towards privatizing Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy 
(WBK) was carried out with an announcement on an issue of new shares to obtain a capital 
injection of 28.5% of the augmented share base. EBRD purchased the entire new issue due to 
absence of interest from a foreign strategic investor. The State Treasury retained a vast share 
in equity (44.3%). In March 1995, Allied Irish Bank (AIB) participated in a second new share -13- 
 
issue by WBK and acquired a 16.26% stake. The new issue reduced EBRD’s stake to 24% 
and AIB signed an agreement with the EBRD to purchase its stake at a future date. Later AIB 
increased its stake to 36% by purchasing an additional 20% of the shares from the Treasury’s 
holding (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997). In 1996, AIB increased its stake to 60.2% in WBK by 
exercising its option to buy the EBRD’s stake (Balcerowicz & Bratkowski, 2001).  
In June 1993, a second commercial bank, Bank Slaski (BSK) was privatized. After 
some difficulties, a strategic foreign investor, ING, has been attracted to the bank with a 
25.92% stake. The State Treasury retained 33.16% in equity. In July 1996, ING purchased 
additional shares from the state to bring its total shareholdings to 54.1%, the government 
retained only a 5% stake. 
In January 1995, the third commercial bank, Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy (BPH) 
was put to sale exclusively in a public offer.  Due to a limited demand, the EBRD as the 
major underwriter of the IPO was left with a 15.6% ownership stake. ING and BSK each took 
5% of the shares, a stake that the group increased subsequently to 12%. The state retained a 
47% stake in BPH after privatization while the remainder of the shares are widely held 
(Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997).  
In December 1995, the fourth commercial bank, Bank Gdañski (BG) was privatized 
with a two-tier IPO: 33% of the shares to be sold to foreign portfolio investors using global 
depository receipts and a 33% stake to domestic investors. A 4% stake was reserved to 
employees and 30% to the state. Bank Inicjatyw Gospodarczch (BIG), a Polish private bank, 
and two of its subsidiaries took a 24.1% stake in the domestic tranche and subsequently 
increased this to 31% while the state retains ownership of 40% of the shares in BG 
(Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997).  
In October 1995, an “Outline of the Program of Consolidation and Privatization of 
State-Owned Banks” was prepared, marking a shift in the privatization process. The emphasis 
of the program was on two mergers of large banks. The main objective of the program was to 
prevent a further foreign capital involvement in the privatization of financial institutions in 
Poland. In fact, Polish banks were considered to be too small in size to survive the invasion 
of foreign banks when entry restrictions are relaxed according to the association agreement 
with the European Union (Bonin & Leven, 1996). However, due to a strong opposition of 
managers of some state-owned banks, the program was revised. Instead of merging banks, in 
July 1996 a decision was taken to form a banking group. Three commercial banks that had 
been finally chosen- Bank Depozytowo Kredytowy (BDK), Powszechny Bank Gospodarczy 
(PBG) and Pomorski Bank Kredytowy (PBKS)- formed a bank group together with PEKAO -14- 
 
S.A. The latter bank was to be a dominant partner for the other three subordinate banks. At 
the same times, two banks - PBK and BH - prepared their own privatization plans. In the first 
half of 1997, the minority of shares of PBK was sold to 3 domestic financial institutions with 
a 39% stake altogether. The State Treasury retained over 50% of shares. In the case of BH, 
the State Treasury sold 25.96% of shares to three foreign investors (J.P. Morgan, Swedbank 
and Zurich Insurance Company) and 59% was sold by IPO. The State Treasury kept only 
7.9% of votes at the general assembly of shareholders and 28−30% of shares via convertible 
bonds (Balcerowicz & Bratkowski, 2001).  
The second wave of privatization in Poland came after the election of the new pro-
reform coalition government in September 1997. The main concept of the privatization policy 
adopted at that time was to choose reputable foreign strategic investors in order to achieve a 
good governance structure in banks and receive capital and technology injections. An 
additional aim was to collect substantial privatization revenues. On 1
st January 1999, Poland 
removed restrictions applied formerly to foreign banks concerning purchases of bigger stock 
blocks, opening new branches and receiving a license to establish a bank in Poland. This 
liberalization was a consequence of commitments undertaken by Poland when joining OECD. 
Bank PEKAO was sold in 1998 by IPO (15%) and in 1999 to a strategic investor: 
Uni-Credito Italiano (52.09% together with Allianz). The last-standing state-owned 
commercial Bank Zachodni was sold to Allied Irish Banks with a 80% stake. The remaining 
shares of the State Treasury in already partly privatized banks were sold to dominant 
shareholders. Finally, PBK was taken over by Bank Austria Creditanstalt, while BH was 
bought in 2000 by Citibank (Balcerowicz & Bratkowski, 2001). 
Overall, a salient feature can be drawn from the privatization experiences of the three 
countries as described above with regard to the role of foreign investors. Indeed, Hungary 
was earliest and smooth in allowing entries of strategic foreign investors. As a result, they 
ended up with the strongest banking system in the region. By contrast, although the Czech 
Republic and Poland started the privatization processes very early (even earlier than 
Hungary), political deterrence and a general defiance vis-à-vis foreign acquisitions of state-
owned banks due to fear of foreign control of domestic banking systems have considerably 
retarded the transformation of banks into independent economic agents, and as a result the 





For the greenfield entry sample, we wish to thank S. Claessens from the International 
Monetary Fund for generously providing us with the data. His data is taken from Bureau van 
Dijk's BankScope database, and originally run from 1987 to 1996. We first delete the years 
1987 and 1996 due to their having too little observations. Because we control for reforms 
other than liberalization to foreign entry, and data for these reforms are available only from 
1989, the year 1988 is also naturally excluded from the sample. The final sample is 
unbalanced, consisting of 9 banks at a minimum in 1989, and 75 banks at a maximum in 
1994. Only commercial banks are taken into account. We would have liked to distinguish 
between foreign and domestic banks, but the data doesn’t allow us to do this.  
For the acquisition entry sample, we also obtained data from BankScope, version 
2006. As it is commonly known by academic researchers and professionals, the data for 
banks from less developed and transition countries require substantial editing before a 
reliable sample can be constructed. We therefore carefully review our data to avoid double 
counting of institutions, to exclude non-bank financial institutions from the sample. We also 
exclude banks that are not commercial, cooperative and savings banks to ensure that we are 
estimating performance based on a relatively homogeneous group of banks. With respect to 
the type of account, we prefer unconsolidated accounts to consolidated ones wherever 
available. Once the type of account chosen, we take the account following the international 
financial reporting standards (IFRS) wherever available. If not, we take the account with 
local accounting standards. Nevertheless, sometimes, IAS data are available for only one or 
two years while longer time series are available in local standards. In such cases we use local 
standards. Thus, our final sample is unbalanced, consisting of 34 banks at a minimum in 
1994, and 98 banks at a maximum in 1999 and 2000. The period under study runs from 1994 
to 2004. The distribution of banks by ownership and mode of entry is given in table 4.2. 
While BankScope has a very large coverage of banks over the world, this database provides 
information on bank ownership only for the current calendar year. Thus, we have had to track 
the evolution in the ownership of each bank over time through several sources, including 
banks’ official publications and Zephyr (Bureau Van Dijk)
6. This enabled us to differentiate 
                                                 
6 We are grateful to R.d. Haas and I.v. Lelyveld from de Nederlandsche Bank for kindly sharing data on bank 
ownership for the years 1994 to 2001.  -16- 
 
between foreign and domestic banks, and, amongst foreign banks, between greenfield 
investments and merger and acquisition entries. 
For both samples, we select the three most advanced countries in Central Europe, i.e. 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland for reasons discussed in the introduction.  
3.2. Variables 
 
Bank performance. To measure bank performance, we use two conventional indicators of the 
well-being of firms: accounting measures of profitability and costs. Banks’ profits are 
measured by the ratio of profits before tax over total assets. Banks’ costs are measured as 
overhead over total assets. We also look at a specific measure of banking performance: 
banks’ interest margins.  
 
Liberalization Dates. We determine the dates on which a text was passed by legislation 
allowing entry by greenfield banks, and purchases of domestic banks by foreign banks in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Choosing these dates is arduous, and sometimes 
requires judgements. For the acquisition entry date, in case there are multiple such dates, we 
choose that on which foreign banks were allowed to acquire a majority ownership stake in 
domestic banks. 
Indeed, in the Czech Republic, the Act on Banks was passed in February 1992, which 
allowed the licensing of foreign banks. Therefore, we choose 1992 as the greenfield entry 
date for the Czech Republic. 
In Hungary, although foreign banks were already present before 1987, and the break-
up of the mono-bank system occurred in 1987, we do not choose this year as the greenfield 
entry date because at this time, the country was still under centralized economy. In 1991, the 
banking Act was passed, and the influx of foreign banks began in this year (see section 2.1). 
Therefore, we choose 1991 as the greenfield entry date for Hungary. 
In Poland, the Act on Banking voted in January 1989 effectively opened up the 
market to foreign investors. Therefore, 1989 is the greenfield entry date for Poland. 
We now discuss the choices of liberalization dates for the acquisition entry sample. In 
the Czech Republic, there were two waves of privatization. The first wave of privatization by 
voucher led to diffuse ownership in banks, with the government retaining a controlling stake, 
and foreign participation being limited to a maximum of 25% stake. The second wave began 
in 1997 with the adoption of a new privatization program aiming at accelerating state--17- 
 
controlled banks’ privatization. Subsequently, foreign banks entered by acquiring a majority 
ownership stake in partially privatized domestic banks. Although Zivnostenka Banka was 
completely sold to foreign investors in 1992, we consider this as an exceptional case rather 
than the beginning of a movement which can have impacts on the banking sector (see section 
2.3). Therefore, we choose 1997 as the acquisition entry date for the Czech Republic. 
For Hungary, things are much clearer as the privatization program adopted in 1994 
was the unique program precluding a privatization process that quickly completed by the end 
of 1997 (see section 2.3). Therefore, 1994 is the acquisition entry date for Hungary. 
In Poland, as in the Czech Republic, there were two waves of privatization. The first 
wave was initiated in 1991 when a program of privatization of state-owned banks was 
adopted. It led to partial privatizations as foreign banks were allowed to participate with only 
a small stake while the government still kept a substantial part in banks. The second wave 
began in 1999 with the removal of restrictions applied formerly to foreign banks concerning 
purchases of bigger stock blocks, thus enabling them to acquire a majority ownership stake in 
domestic banks (see section 2.3). Therefore, 1999 is chosen as the acquisition entry date for 
Poland. 
 
Bank Characteristics. We take into account the following characteristics of banks: bank size, 
as denoted by log of total assets; loans over total assets, which reflects a bank’s asset 
structure
7; equity ratio equal to equity over total assets, which reflects the risk preferences of 
banks; operating costs as measured by overheads over total assets. 
 
Banking Sector Structure Variables. We include three proxies for banking sector structure: 
market share as measured by the share of a bank’s assets over the banking system’s total 
assets; Herfindahl index as denoted by the sum of squares of banks’ market shares; and two 
dummies for foreign takeover and domestic banks. 
 
Other Reform Variables. To control for the possibility that the evolution in bank performance 
measures is the results of other reforms rather than the liberalization to foreign bank entry, we 
take into account indexes of banking, price and enterprise reforms obtained from EBRD.  
 
                                                 
7 One argument that could justify the control for the structure of assets can be drawn from (Havrylchyk, 2006) 
for the case of Poland “During the analyzed period the structure of assets underwent a drastic change. Previous 
easy sources of income, such as Treasury bonds and loans to blue-chip companies, were exhausted. The banks 
had to tap new and riskier segments of the market, such as households and small and medium enterprises». -18- 
 
Macroeconomic Environment Variables.  We control for the following standard 
macroeconomic environment characteristics as in a number of studies on operating 
performance
8: growth rate of real GDP per capita, inflation, and short-term interest rate of 
deposits. Nevertheless, we don’t include these variables in the regressions on Greenfield 
entry as the data available for the Czech Republic start only from 1992, which greatly reduce 
the length of the period under study. Instead, we include country-fixed effects. 
Table 1 summarizes variable definitions, and table 4 reports descriptive statistics of 
the main variables. When one looks at the figures carefully, a few quick conclusions can be 
drawn. First, contrary to common beliefs on transition economies, the average net interest 
margins of banks in our samples are comparable to western standards (4,4% for the 
Greenfield entry sample, and 3,7% for the acquisition entry sample). However, for 10% of 
the banks in the Greenfield entry sample, the margins are over 8%, and for 1% of them, they 
are over 10%. With regard to the acquisition entry sample, for 5% of the banks, the margins 
are over 8% and for 1% of them, they are over 16%. Second, loans occupy a major part of the 
overall portfolio, in the order of 42.17% for the Greenfield entry sample, and 44.9% for the 
acquisition entry sample. Of course, we are aware of data problems that are relevant for all 
transition countries. Therefore, when analyzing the findings of our research, we should keep 
this bias in mind. 
4. Results 
In this section, we discuss the results of the empirical tests. In the case of liberalization to 
entry of greenfield banks, we examine the evolution in performance of the whole sample of 
banks due to lack of data on ownership as discussed earlier. With regard to the entry of 
takeover banks, we consider the evolution in performance of two sub-samples: the whole 
sample of banks composed of domestic, greenfield, and takeover banks, and the sample of 
domestic banks alone.  
We find a significant drop in banks’ profits in the order of approximately 10% 
following the liberalization to the entry of Greenfield banks (table 5). No significant effect is 
observed on interest margins nor on overhead cost. The drop in bank profitability seems 
large. However, we also observe a similar decrease of bank profitability in the order of 11% 
due to other banking reforms. This might be explained by the fact that domestic banks may 
have to modify their behavior in response to the entry of Greenfield banks by upgrading their 
                                                 
8 See, for example, (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001), (Barajas, Steiner, & Salazar, 2000). -19- 
 
practices and technologies, which incurs non negligible cost. At the same time, attempts to 
rationalize cost through reorganization and hardening of budget constraints take time to 
implement. We don’t believe that the drop in bank profitability is due to increased 
competition from greenfield banks because if this was the case, we would also observe a 
decrease in interest margins. Moreover, stylized facts on transition banking often indicate 
that, at the start of the transition, Greenfield banks operated on different market segments and 
did not compete with domestic banks
9.  
With regard to the entry of foreign banks by acquiring domestic banks, bank 
profitability has also dropped significantly following liberalization. The magnitude of the 
decrease in profitability is greater for domestic banks than for the whole sample of banks 
(2,5% vs. 1,6%). The reason might be that of the three types of banks, greenfield banks – 
included in the whole sample – is least affected by liberalization. Indeed, we’ve run 
regressions on the sample of solely greenfield banks, and found that the profitability of these 
banks dropped by approximately 0.5%, but at a non-significant level
10. These results are 
consistent with a number of studies, such as (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001) 
for a pool of 80 countries, and (Denizer, 2000) for Turkey. In addition, (Clarke G. R., Cull, 
D'Amato, & Molinari, 1999), in a study on Argentina, find decreased profitability only for 
banks which engage in lending to manufacturing sectors, a market segment where foreign 
banks are strongly present. (Unite & Sullivan, 2003) found the same result for Philippine 
banks affiliated to a family group. 
Looking at the results for interest margins in table 9, it is again evident that these have 
dropped significantly following liberalization. Again, the magnitude of the change in interest 
margins is greater for domestic banks than for the whole sample of banks (1.04% vs. 0.54%). 
These results are in contrast with (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001) and 
(Denizer, 2000) which don’t find any significant impact of foreign bank entry on 
intermediation costs. However, they are consistent with (Barajas, Steiner, & Salazar, 2000) 
for Colombia, (Clarke G. R., Cull, D'Amato, & Molinari, 1999) for Argentina, and (Unite & 
Sullivan, 2003) for the Philippines. 
How to explain the significant drop in banks’ profitability and interest margins 
following the removal of barriers to entry of foreign banks by acquiring domestic banks? 
                                                 
9 According to an account by (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997, p. 36) for the case of Poland, the presence of foreign 
banks in the early years of transition has not engendered much competition for domestic banks. They have 
mainly followed their own clients into Poland, and generally limited their activities to servicing their clients’ 
banking needs. 
10 Results are available from the author upon request. -20- 
 
Indeed, bank regulators may influence bank efficiency by affecting the degrees of current and 
potential competition in banking markets with their policies on new bank formation and bank 
mergers. In our case, the removal of legal barriers to entry of foreign banks first influences 
the potential competition in the market because it creates a threat of entry by potential 
competitors. It can also affect the degree of current competition if entries effectively take 
place following liberalization, which is the case in the three countries in question in this 
paper. Indeed, a look at the evolution of the Herfindahl index in each country does indicate an 
intensified competition as these indices for the Czech Republic and Hungary bounced 
exceptionally in 1996 and 1997 respectively, then dropped substantially, and stabilized from 
1998 onwards. The index for Poland dropped constantly between 1994 and 1997, and then 
stabilized. Competition dissipates monopoly profits of large commercial banks, and also 






















































































Figure 1: Evolution of the Herfindahl Index (Source: author’s own calculation) 
The results for operating costs are shown in table 4.10. It can be observed that cost 
rises significantly for both samples following liberalization. Once again, the magnitude of the 
increase in cost is more important for domestic banks than for the whole sample (3.54% vs. 
2.17%). These results are in stark contrast with (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Huizinga, 
2001) and (Denizer, 2000), but consistent with (Clarke G. R., Cull, D'Amato, & Molinari, -21- 
 
1999) who finds a significant increase in administrative cost for banks concentrating on 
mortgages lending where the presence of foreign banks is increasing.  
How to explain the increase in operating costs following entry of takeover banks? In 
principle, microeconomics and corporate governance theories would suggest drops in banks’ 
cost. Indeed, the threat of entry by potential stronger competitors from abroad following the 
removal of legal barriers to foreign entry would force domestic bank managers to give up 
their “quiet life” and to exert greater effort to reach cost efficiency.  On the other hand, the 
removal of legal barriers to the entry of foreign banks by acquiring domestic banks creates a 
market for corporate control, which, according to corporate governance theories, may serve 
as a means to discipline bank managers.  In theory, one of the major benefits of corporate 
takeovers is that the threat of a takeover provides management with the incentive to 
maximize firm value. Otherwise, the firm may be acquired by another economic agent to be 
transformed into a more efficient entity, and as a result, the current management is replaced. 
The consequence of such a threat is that incentives exist for managers to efficiently run their 
firms.  
However, in our case, the decrease in cost resulting from disciplining effects on bank 
managers may not be large enough to offset the increase in operating cost stemming from the 
fact that merged and acquired banks need substantial restructuring which incurs non 
negligible cost. Moreover, domestic banks may also need considerable new investment, 
especially on information technology infrastructure, to withstand the challenge from foreign 
competitors. 
Turning into control variables, we observe that size is significantly and positively 
related to profitability, but negatively related to operating cost. This might indicate some 
scale effects which allows banks to achieve higher performance, and at the same time to 
reduce cost. Banks with higher capital asset ratios tend to enjoy significantly higher 
profitability and interest margins, which might be explained by the existence of depositor 
discipline in transition banking. Indeed, well-capitalized firms face lower expected 
bankruptcy cost for themselves and for their customers, thus can get a reduction of their cost 
of funding (Berger A. N., 1995). This represents a form of depositor market discipline which 
has been confirmed by empirical evidence (Goldberg & Hudgins, 2002) and (Park & 
Peristiani, 1998) for the U.S. savings and loan associations, and by (Karas, Pyle, & Schoors, 
2006) for Russia. (Martinez Peria & Schmukler, 1999) finds evidence that market discipline 
more generally exists in developing countries, even in the presence of deposit insurance. In -22- 
 
Central and Eastern Europe, the recurrent asset quality problems and bank failures episodes 
would induce depositors to act prudently and to avoid deposits in under-capitalized banks.  
Portfolio composition, as reflected by the loan variable, is significantly and positively 
related to net interest margins in both the Greenfield and acquisition entry cases, which 
indicates that banks with a higher proportion of loans in their portfolio tend to have higher 
margins. Since loans are often the most risky asset
11, this finding indicates that banks have 
integrated the risk factor in their loan pricing, and consequently, lending results in wider 
margins. Operating costs tend to reduce significantly domestic banks’ profitability in the 
acquisition entry sample, but increase significantly interest margins in both entry cases. This 
lends support to the efficient-structure hypothesis which suggests that differences in banks’ 
profitability and interest margins are attributable, in opposite ways, to differences in 
operational efficiency.  
Concerning banking structure variables, M&As and domestic banks tend to have 
lower profitability than Greenfield banks, which is consistent with existing findings in the 
literature pointing to a superior performance of Greenfield banks. The negative coefficients 
on both merger and domestic in the net interest margin regression indicate that these types of 
banks also experience lower interest margins than Greenfield banks. These results 
corroborate previous results by (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999) (Barajas, Steiner, & 
Salazar, 2000), and might reflect the fact that the better reputation and superior banking 
expertise and services of Greenfield banks may allow them to borrow funds at lower rates 
while at the same time lending at higher rates than their counterparts. 
The coefficients on herfin are positively and significantly related to profitability and 
interest margins in the Greenfield entry case, a finding that lends support to the traditional 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis according to which banks in more 
concentrated markets earn higher profitability and interest margins due to a non-competitive 
pricing behavior. However, the Herfindahl index is negatively and significantly related to 
both profitability and interest margin in the acquisition entry sample, although the magnitude 
of the impact seems very small. This result, though unexpected, corroborates those obtained 
by (Claeys & Vander Vennet, 2004) for a sample of Eastern European countries, and might 
be a reflection of the rapid development of bank lending in these countries in the latter part of 
the 1990s. Market share is negatively related to profitability and interest margin for the whole 
                                                 
11 (Havrylchyk, 2006) offers indications of augmented risks in lending for the case of Poland “During the 
analyzed period the structure of assets underwent a drastic change. Previous easy sources of income, such as 
Treasury bonds and loans to blue-chip companies, were exhausted. The banks had to tap new and riskier 
segments of the market, such as households and small and medium enterprises». -23- 
 
sample of banks in the acquisition entry sample. This result does not corroborate the relative-
market-power hypothesis
12 and means that ceteris paribus, larger banks are not able to reap 
the benefices of their market power in pricing. 
Amongst other reforms, enterprise reform appears to exert most significant impact by 
increasing banks’ profitability, and reducing margins in the acquisition entry sample. With 
respect to the macroeconomic environment, inflation and interest rates affect profitability and 
interest margins positively. We don’t observe any effect of the business cycle as denoted by 
the growth variable on bank performance. 
In summary, the liberalization to entry of greenfield banks has had a limited effect on 
bank performance. By contrast, bank performance has significantly improved following the 
liberalization to foreign mergers and acquisitions of domestic banks. These results therefore 
confirm the differential implications of the two types of foreign entry as suggested by 
theoretical analysis on foreign bank entry.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the effects of the two modes of entry of foreign banks – 
Greenfield investments vs. mergers and acquisitions of domestic banks - in an empirical 
setting. The results show a very limited effect of the entry of Greenfield banks on domestic 
banking market in the early transition period. In contrast, the foreign entry by mergers and 
acquisitions of domestic banks exerts significant impacts on bank performance. Indeed, we 
observe significant declines in banks' profits and net interest margins, and a significant 
increase in operating costs. These results therefore confirm the differential implications of the 
two types of foreign entry as suggested by theoretical analysis on foreign entry. 
Our results have important policy implications. Indeed, they show that the 
liberalization to the entry of de novo banks is not sufficient to bring significant changes to the 
domestic banking market. Real benefits come mainly with foreign acquisitions of domestic 
banks. These conclusions contribute to shed light on the decisions to be made by those 
emerging and transition countries still hesitant to engage in this way.  
The policy implications of our analysis should, nevertheless, be treated with caution. 
We have investigated the effect of the liberalization to entry of de novo banks in a period 
where the scope of activities of these banks was rather limited. This may bias our results. It 
                                                 
12 This theory suggests that banks with higher market shares are able to exercise power in pricing, and 
consequently earn higher market share. 
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would be preferable to extend the period studied into the one in which Greenfield banks 
started being interested in looking for local business opportunities. -25- 
 
References [to be completed] 
Abarbanell, J. S., & Bonin, J. P. (1997). Bank Privatization in Poland: The Case of Bank 
Slaski. Journal of Comparative Economics , 25 (1). 
Balcerowicz, E., & Bratkowski, A. (2001). Restructuring and Development of the Banking 
Sector in Poland. Lessons to be Learnt by Less Advanced Transition Countries. Center for 
Social and Economic Research Report , 44. 
Barajas, A., Steiner, R., & Salazar, N. (2000). The Impact of Liberalization and Foreign 
Investment in Colombia's Financial Sector. Journal of Development Economics , 63, 157-
196. 
Bekaert, G., & Harvey, C. R. (2004). Chronology of Important Financial, Economic and 
Political Events in Emerging Markets. 
http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Country_risk/chronology/bibliography.htm . 
Berger, A. N. (1995). The Relationship Between Capital and Earnings in Banking. Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking , 27, 432-456. 
Berger, A. N., DeYoung, R., Genay, H., & Udell, G. F. (2000). Globalization of financial 
institutions: evidence from cross-border banking performance. Brookings-Wharton Papers 
on Financial Services . 
Bonin, J. P., & Leven, B. (1996). Polish Bank Consolidation and Foreign Competition: 
Creating a Market-Oriented Banking Sector. Journal of Comparative Economics , 23 (1). 
Bonin, J. P., Hasan, I., & Wachtel, P. (2005b). Bank Performance, Efficiency and Ownership 
in Transition Countries. Journal of Banking and Finance , 29, 31-53. 
Bonin, J., & Wachtel, P. (1999). Towards Market-Oriented Banking in the Economies in 
Transition. In M. Blejer, & M. Skreb, Financial Sector Transformation: Lessons from the 
Economies in Transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buch, C. (2003). Information or regulation: What drives the international activities of 
commercial banks? Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking , 35 (6), 851–869. 
Buch, C. M. (2003). Information or regulation: What drives the international activities of 
commercial banks? Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking , 35 (6), 851–869. 
Claessens, S., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, H. (2001). How does foreign entry affect 
domestic banking markets? Journal of Banking and Finance , 25 (5), 891-911. 
Claeys, S., & Hainz, C. (2006). Acquisition versus Greenfield: The Impact of the Mode of 
Foreign Bank Entry on Information and Bank Lending Rates. European Central Bank 
Working Paper Series . -26- 
 
Claeys, S., & Vander Vennet, R. (2004). Determinants of Bank Interest Margins in Central 
and Eastern Europe: A Comparison with the West. http://www.eu-financial-
system.org/fileadmin/content/Dokumente_Events/first_conference/Claeys_VanderVennet.p
df . 
Clarke, G. R., Cull, R., D'Amato, L., & Molinari, A. (1999, August). The Effect of Foreign 
Entry on Argentina's Domestic Banking Sector. The World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper Series . 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, H. (1999). Determinants of Commercial Bank Interest 
Margins and Profitability: Some International Evidence. World Bank Economic Review , 
13 (2), 379-408. 
Denizer, C. (2000, October). Foreign entry in Turkey's banking sector, 1980-97. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper Series . 
Goldberg, L., & Hudgins, S. (2002). Depositor Discipline and Changing Strategies for 
Regulating Thrift Institutions. Journal of Financial Economics , 63, 263–274. 
Hauswald, R., & Marquez, R. (2003). Information technology and financial services 
competition. Review of Financial Studies , 16 (3), 921–948. 
Havrylchyk, O. (2006). Efficiency of the Polish banking industry: Foreign versus domestic 
banks. Journal of Banking and Finance , 30 (7), 1975-1996. 
Kaas, L. (2004). Financial market integration and loan competition—When is entry 
deregulation socially beneficial? European Central bank Working Paper Series . 
Karas, A., Pyle, W., & Schoors, K. (2006). Sophisticated Discipline in a Nascent Deposit 
Market: Evidence from Post-Communist Russia. BOFIT Discussion Papers , 13. 
Kormendi, R. C., & Schnatterly, K. (1996). Bank Privatization in Hungary and the Magyar 
Kulkereskedelmi Bank Transaction. William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series . 
Lehner, M., & Schnitzer, M. (2008). Entry of foreign banks and their impact on host 
countries. Journal of Comparative Economics , doi:10.1016/j.jce.2008.02.002. 
Majnoni, G., Shankar, R., & Varhegyi, E. (2003). The Dynamics of Foreign Bank Ownership 
- Evidence from Hungary. The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series , 3114. 
Martinez Peria, S., & Schmukler, S. (1999). Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? 
Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper , 2058. 
Mathieson, D. J., & Schinasi, G. J. (2000). World Economic and Financial Surveys: 
International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues. 
International Monetary Fund. -27- 
 
Park, S., & Peristiani, S. (1998). Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors. Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking , 30, 347–364. 
Pruteanu-Podpiera, A., Weill, L., & Schobert, F. (2008). Banking Competition and 
Efficiency: A Micro-Data Analysis on the Czech Banking Industry. Comparative 
Economic Studies , forthcoming. 
Sengupta, R. (2007). Foreign entry and bank competition. Journal of Financial Economics , 
84 (2), 502-528. 
Tang, H., Zoli, E., & Klytchnikova, I. (2000, November). Banking Crises in Transition 
Economies: Fiscal Costs and Related Issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 
2484. 
Tuma, Z. (2002). Banking Sector Development in the Czech Republic. Mimeo . 
Van Tassel, E., & Vishwasrao, S. (2007). Asymmetric information and the mode of entry in 
foreign credit markets. Journal of Banking and Finance , 31 (2), 3742-3760. 
Vo Thi, N. A., & Vencappa, D. (2008, August). Does the Entry Mode of Foreign Bank 
Matter for Bank Efficiency? Evidence from Transition Countries. The William Davidson 
Institute Working Paper Series , 925. 
Weill, L. (2003). Banking Efficiency in Transition Economies: The Role of Foreign 





Tableau 1: Definitions of variables 
Name  Definition  Source of data 
Dependent variables 
profit  ratio of profits before tax to total assets; in percentage. It 
denotes a bank’s profitability. 
BankScope 
irmargin  ratio of net interest revenue to total assets; in percentage. It 
denotes a bank’s net interest margin. 
BankScope 
oper_cost  ratio of overheads to total assets; in percentage. It denotes a 
bank’s operating costs. 
BankScope 
Liberalization variables 
greenfield  dummy variable indicating liberalization to entry of 
Greenfield banks; 1 for the years following the 
liberalization, and 0 otherwise. 
Author's own research 
takeover  dummy variable indicating liberalization to foreign 
acquisition of domestic banks; 1 for the years following 
liberalization, and 0 otherwise. 
Author's own research 
Bank-specific variables 
size  log of total assets. It denotes bank size.  BankScope 
equity  ratio of equity to total assets; in percentage. It denotes the 
risk preferences of banks. 
BankScope 
loan  ratio of loans to total assets; in percentage. It denotes a 
bank’s portfolio composition. 
BankScope 
Banking sector structure variables 
merger  dummy variable for foreign takeover bank.  R.d. Haas, I.v. Lelyveld & 
author's own  research 
domestic  dummy variable for domestic bank.  R.d. Haas, I.v. Lelyveld & 
author's own  research 
herfin  Herfindahl index; sum of squares of banks’ market shares. 
It is an index of market concentration.  
BankScope 
sharemar  ratio of a bank’ assets to total banking system’s assets; in 
percentage. It denotes a bank’s market share of assets. 
BankScope 
Reform variables 
bank  index of banking reform.  EBRD 
enter  index of enterprise reform.  EBRD 
price  index of price liberalization.  EBRD 
Country-specific control variables 
lgdp  log of real gdp per capita.  PWT 6.2 
inflation  annual inflation of the GDP deflator.  WDI 
irate  for the Czech Republic and Hungary: average rate 
weighted by volume on the three-month Treasury bills sold 
at auctions (Line 60C.ZF); for Poland: discount rate (end 




Tableau 2: Distribution of banks by ownership and modes of entry, Acquisition entry sample 
 Czech  Republic  Hungary  Poland  Total 
1994        
domestic 6 5  13  24 
greenfield 5 3 2  10 
mergers     
Total 11  8 15 34 
1995        
domestic 6 6  14  26 
greenfield 5 4 3  12 
mergers     
Total 11 10 17 38 
1996        
domestic 9 6  20  35 
greenfield 5 6 3  14 
mergers   1   1 
Total 14 13 23 50 
1997        
domestic 9 6  28  43 
greenfield  10 6 6  22 
mergers   3 3 6 
Total 19 15 37 71 
1998        
domestic 11  7 26 44 
greenfield 11 10 13 34 
mergers 2 9 3  14 
Total 24 26 42 92 
1999        
domestic 11  6 26 43 
greenfield 12 13 14 39 
mergers 4 9 3  16 
Total 27 28 43 98 
2000        
domestic 10  6 21 37 
greenfield 12 14 14 40 
mergers 5 9 7  21 
Total 27 29 42 98 
2001        
domestic 8 7  15  30 
greenfield 11 11 16 38 
mergers 7 8 8  23 
Total 26 26 39 91 
2002        
domestic 6 9  12  27 
greenfield 10 12 17 39 
mergers 9 8  10  27 
Total 25 29 39 93 
2003        
domestic 6 8  13  27 
greenfield 10 12 17 39 
mergers 9 7  12  28 
Total 25 27 42 94 
2004        
domestic 6 7  12  25 
greenfield 10 14 16 40 
mergers 8 7  12  27 




Tableau 3: Liberalization dates 
Country Liberalization  Type  Year 
Greenfield Entry  1992  Czech Republic 
Acquisition Entry  1997 
Greenfield Entry  1991  Hungary 
Acquisition Entry  1994 
Greenfield Entry  1989  Poland 
Acquisition Entry  1999 -31- 
 
Tableau 4: Descriptive statistics 
Greenfield Entry Sample* 
 
Variable     Observations Mean S.D Min Max
profit  311 1.91 5.21 -49.69 12.21
irmargin  310 4.40 2.77 -8.23 14.76
lnassets  315 8.87 2.20 2.42 12.87
loan  315 42.17 19.64 0.00 94.75
equity  315 13.08 12.82 -3.47 82.48
sharemar  315 6.67 11.90 0.03 100.00
oper_cost 292 4.14 7.42 0.07 99.30  
 
Acquisition Entry Sample* 
          
Variables Observations  Mean  S.  D  Min  Max 
  Wh. Sample  Domestic  Wh. Sample  Domestic  Wh. Sample  Domestic  Wh. Sample  Domestic  Wh. Sample  Domestic 
profit  859  360  0.80 0.06  4.35 6.05  -39.18 -39.18  14.52  14.52 
irmargin  857  360  3.72 3.80  2.76 2.48  -8.06 -8.06  21.56 21.56 
lnassets  861  361  6.52 6.58  1.48 1.53  1.71 2.48  10.29  10.29 
loan  861  361  44.90 42.11  20.62 19.73  0.00  0.00  98.01 96.91 
equity  861  361  12.68 11.80  13.53 14.54  -55.56 -55.56  98.41  84.47 
sharemar  861  361  3.83 5.08  6.34 8.18  0.01 0.04  51.93  51.93 
oper_cost  856  359  4.63 5.07  5.79 5.06  -1.88 -1.88  129.17 60.63 
 
*All variables are in percentage, except lnassets. 
 -32- 
 
Tableau 5: Changes in Bank Profitability following Greenfield Entry 
Independent variables  Whole sample 
greenfield  -9.605 
  (3.643)*** 
size  0.811 
  (0.518) 
loan  0.024 
  (0.015) 
equity  0.159 
  (0.055)*** 
sharemar  0.015 
  (0.039) 
oper_cost  0.041 
  (0.060) 
herfin  0.004 
  (0.002)** 
bank  -11.814 
  (4.644)** 
enter  -2.075 
  (1.173)* 
price  0.526 
 (0.507) 
country_2  2.221 
  (2.398) 
country_3  10.205 
  (3.355)*** 
year_2  -46.416 
  (19.399)** 
year_3  -40.393 
  (16.915)** 
year_4  -26.266 
  (10.745)** 
year_5  -14.641 
  (5.823)** 
year_6  -1.620 
  (0.890)* 
year_7  0.424 
  (0.611) 
Constant  30.403 
  (14.557)** 
Observations 287 
Number of banks  77 
R-squared 0.19 
NOTES: Panel data econometrics techniques are used in doing regressions. Indeed, an Hausman test 
indicates that a random-effects specification is appropriate. A Breusch-Pagan test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity, and the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation indicate the presence of 
heteroskedasticityin the residuals. We therefore choose the random-effects regression with robust standard 
errors. Sample period: 1989-1995. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes a significant level at 
10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%. -33- 
 
 
Tableau 6: Changes in Banks' Net Interest Margin following Greenfield Entry 
Independent variables  Whole sample 
greenfield  -1.359 
  (1.902) 
size  0.467 
  (0.160)*** 
loan  0.034 
  (0.007)*** 
equity  0.029 
  (0.019) 
sharemar  -0.044 
  (0.021)** 
oper_cost  0.140 
  (0.027)*** 
herfin  0.002 
  (0.001)** 
bank  -3.054 
  (2.144) 
enter  -1.045 
  (0.670) 
price  0.516 
  (0.274)* 
country_2  2.943 
  (0.805)*** 
country_3  5.999 
  (0.962)*** 
year_2  -14.459 
  (9.073) 
year_3  -12.690 
  (8.001) 
year_4  -7.484 
  (5.169) 
year_5  -4.004 
  (2.844) 
year_6  -0.638 
  (0.468) 
year_7  0.003 
  (0.275) 
Constant  3.931 
  (8.417) 
Observations  286 
Number of banks  77 
R-squared  0.40 
NOTES: Panel data econometrics techniques are used in doing regressions. Indeed, an Hausman test 
indicates that a random-effects specification is appropriate. A Breusch-Pagan test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity, and the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation indicate the presence of both -34- 
 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1 in the residuals. We therefore choose the Prais-Winsten 
regression with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors and an AR(1) process in the error terms. 
Sample period: 1989-1995. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes a significant level at 10% 
level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%. 
Tableau 7: Changes in Banks' Operating Costs following Greenfield Entry 
Independent variables  Whole sample 
greenfield  -3.021 
  (3.833) 
size  -0.691 
  (0.470) 
loan  -0.022 
  (0.017) 
equity  0.226 
  (0.127)* 
sharemar  0.107 
  (0.059)* 
herfin  0.002 
  (0.002) 
bank  -5.618 
  (4.381) 
enter  -2.938 
  (2.425) 
price  -0.730 
  (0.523) 
country_2  5.782 
  (2.259)** 
country_3  0.239 
  (2.528) 
year_2  -34.975 
  (20.762)* 
year_3  -29.742 
  (18.081)* 
year_4  -18.866 
  (11.736) 
year_5  -11.539 
  (6.872)* 
year_6  -2.356 
  (1.367)* 
year_7  -0.949 
  (0.734) 
Constant  36.193 
  (18.489)* 
Observations  287 
Number of banks  77 
R-squared  0.20 
NOTES: Panel data econometrics techniques are used in doing regressions. Indeed, an Hausman test 
indicates that a random-effects specification is appropriate. A Breusch-Pagan test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity, and the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation indicate the presence of both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1 in the residuals. We therefore choose the Prais-Winsten -35- 
 
regression with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors and an AR(1) process in the error terms. 
Sample period: 1989-1995. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes a significant level at 10% 
level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%. -36- 
 
Tableau 8: Changes in Banks' Profitability Following Liberalization to Foreign 
Acquisition of Domestic Banks 
 (1)  (2) 
Independent variables  Whole sample   Domestic banks 
takeover  -1.619  -2.535 
  (0.640)***  (1.266)** 
size  3.277  1.944 
  (0.956)***  (1.329) 
loan  0.006  -0.021 
  (0.015)  (0.024) 
equity  0.176  0.150 
  (0.043)***  (0.056)*** 
sharemar  -0.094  0.029 
  (0.055)*  (0.068) 
oper_cost  -0.204  -0.635 
  (0.158)  (0.085)*** 
merger  -2.873   
  (1.009)***   
domestic  -3.450   
  (0.596)***   
herfin  -0.003  -0.005 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
bank  -0.361  0.178 
  (1.108)  (2.188) 
enter  3.641  11.547 
  (1.856)**  (3.456)*** 
price  10.453  14.971 
  (4.365)**  (7.486)** 
growth  0.211  0.316 
  (0.183)  (0.354) 
inflation  0.306  0.525 
  (0.073)***  (0.148)*** 
irate  0.089  0.294 
  (0.061)  (0.100)*** 
Observations  854  368 
Number of banks  148  77 
R-squared  0.34  0.60 
NOTES: Panel data econometrics techniques are used in doing regressions. Indeed, a Hausman test 
indicates that a fixed-effects specification is appropriate for both cases. A modified Wald test for group-
wise heteroskedasticity, and the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation indicate the presence of both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1 in the residuals in both cases. We therefore choose the 
fixed-effects models with Newey-West standard errors and an AR (1) process in the error terms for both 
samples. Year dummies are included in the regressions but not reported here. Country dummies are also 
included but dropped due to colinearity. Sample period: 1994-2004. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * denotes a significant level at 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%. -37- 
 
 
Tableau 9: Changes in Banks' Interest Margin Following Liberalization to Foreign 
Acquisition of Domestic Banks  
 (1)  (2) 
Independent variables  Whole sample   Domestic banks 
takeover  -0.539  -1.037 
  (0.333)*  (0.518)** 
size  0.541  0.116 
  (0.288)*  (0.132) 
loan  0.018  0.021 
  (0.006)***  (0.008)*** 
equity  0.092  0.081 
  (0.016)***  (0.016)*** 
sharemar  -0.049  0.015 
  (0.020)**  (0.020) 
oper_cost  0.100  0.067 
  (0.024)***  (0.022)*** 
merger  -3.861   
  (1.332)***   
domestic  -3.767   
  (1.318)***   
herfin  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.000)*  (0.000)*** 
bank  -0.258  -0.557 
  (0.497)  (0.715) 
enter  -2.451  -2.540 
  (0.826)***  (1.544)* 
price  -1.367  0.154 
  (1.664)  (2.049) 
growth  0.020  0.019 
  (0.078)  (0.120) 
inflation  0.011  0.144 
  (0.036)  (0.041)*** 
irate  -0.041  0.053 
  (0.027)  (0.032)* 
Constant    8.621 
  (8.025) 
Observations  852  369 
Number of banks  147  78 
R-squared  0.36  0.46 
NOTES: Panel data econometrics techniques are used in doing regressions. Indeed, an Hausman test 
indicates that a fixed-effects specification is appropriate for (1), and a random-effects specification for (2). 
A modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity for (1), a Breusch-Pagan test for (2), and the 
Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation for both indicate the presence of both heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of order 1 in the residuals in both cases. We therefore choose the fixed-effects model with 
Newey-West standard errors and an AR (1) process in the error terms for (1), and the Prais-Winsten 
regression with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors and an AR(1) process in the error terms for 
(2). Year dummies are included in the regressions but not reported here. Country dummies are also -38- 
 
included but dropped due to colinearity. Sample period: 1994-2004. Robust standard errors are in 




Tableau 10: Changes in Banks' Operating Costs Following Liberalization to Foreign 
Acquisition of Domestic Banks 
 (1)  (2) 
Independent variables  Whole sample   Domestic banks 
takeover  2.168  3.544 
  (1.316)*  (1.845)** 
size  -3.470  -1.222 
  (0.651)***  (0.325)*** 
loan  -0.036  -0.044 
  (0.024)  (0.023)* 
equity  0.013  -0.037 
  (0.085)  (0.065) 
sharemar  0.091  0.037 
  (0.066)  (0.051) 
merger  -1.000   
  (1.290)   
domestic  -0.935   
  (0.898)   
herfin  0.002  0.002 
  (0.001)*  (0.001)** 
bank  -2.973  -1.833 
  (2.711)  (2.091) 
enter  -3.870  5.097 
  (4.241)  (5.666) 
price  -17.090  -8.269 
  (11.174)  (6.498) 
growth  -0.408  0.191 
  (0.326)  (0.330) 
inflation  -0.077  -0.012 
  (0.100)  (0.059) 
irate  -0.061  0.116 
  (0.138)  (0.109) 
Constant    34.351 
  (31.838) 
Observations  854  369 
Number of banks  148  78 
R-squared  0.13  0.14 
NOTES: Panel data econometrics techniques are used in doing regressions. Indeed, an Hausman test 
indicates that a fixed-effects specification is appropriate for (1), and a random-effects specification for (2). 
A modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity for (1), a Breusch-Pagan test for (2), and the 
Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation for both indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity in both 
cases, and of autocorrelation of order 1 in the residuals in (1). We therefore choose the fixed-effects model 
with Newey-West standard errors and an AR (1) process in the error terms for (1), and the random-effects 
model with robust standard errors for (2). Year dummies are included in the regressions but not reported 
here. Country dummies are also included but dropped due to colinearity. Sample period: 1994-2004. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes a significant level at 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 
1%.  
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